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That corruption is widespread, and growing, in
the poorer parts of the world (and perhaps not
only there) needs no demonstration, and in recent
years much discussion has been directed to its
effect on development. Some would contend that
it is very harmful not only directly, but also
indirectly by weakening political stability. Others
see some virtues in it. It may be of interest to
consider these arguments.
There is little ambiguity about the nature of
corruption. Simply put, it is the use of one's
office for private advantage. This can occur in
both State and private office, but the public is
naturally more interested in the former, and
we shall limit ourselves to it.
The most frequent and obvious charge against
corruption ¡s that by directing the flow of
resources away from state projects into the
pockets of individuals, it hinders development.
This argument assumes, of course, that the
bureaucracy and its political masters know best
what makes for development. But however one
defines this process, whether in terms of a richer
country, or of lesser differences of wealth among
its subjects, the evidence for this proposition is
not convincing. On the contrary, it is clear that
not all official projects do in fact assist develop-
ment, and even when they do, it is not always
the case that they are the best use of resources.
as much melancholy evidence goes to show.
A more sociological argument against corruption
is that it often involves the creation of patron-
client links, and certainly does not make for the
impersonality and universality said to accompany
development. However, even in the West there
are sufficient examples of particularistic social
arrangements, such as family firms of great
standing. both old and new, to suggest that the
requirement of universalism may be confusing
the contingent with the necessary.
One way or another corruption does not seem to
have greatly impeded the development of many
now fully industrialised countries; Britain, the
United States, and the Soviet Union1 are cases
in point. In the present day Iran. developing
rapidly, has much the same reputation.
Indonesia knew considerabte corruption under the
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system of 'Guided Democracy' from 1959 to
1965, a period of economic decline; it has, by
all accounts, considerably more now under the
'New Order', but is developing more rapidly than
at any time since the 1930s.
However, it is sometimes argued that a new
consideration should be borne in mind with
regard to most poor countries. For them, the
role of foreign investment is crucial, and
corruption may well discourage it. Further
reflection, however, suggests that this is so only
when corruption is capricious and unpredictable.
So long as it is known and fixed, the investor
simply regards it as a tax which he can throw
into his calculus. Of course, corruption, being of
its nature secret, is often capricious; but even
then it is no more discouraging than is the
amiable custom followed by certain governments
of changing the rules for foreign investment after
it has been made.
Often cited as evidence for the charge that
rampant corruption may destroy confidence in
government is Republican China in its latter
years, and its subsequent overthrow by the
Communist insurgents. This argument seems to
oserlook the weakening of government by the
long struggle against the Japanese invaders on the
one hand and the Communists on the other, not
to mention the accompanying inflation. If
corruption played a part, military debility and
monetary devaluation played even larger, and
perhaps more decisive ones. Certainly, corrup-
tion in nineteenth-century Britain and the United
States does not seem to have affected confidence
in their governments. In present-day Indonesia
the government appears more stable than at any
time since Independence in 1945. On the other
hand, it is not difficult to think of governments
without a taint of corruption who have lost
support.
Is it then true that corruption helps development?
Certainly, a bribe that cuts through red tape may
result in the more rapid execution of a project;
whether this makes for development is a matter
for further examination. Equally, to divert funds
froni the state sector into the private does not
necessarily make for development: it depends
what they were intended for, and how they will
now be used. If, as sometimes happens, they
find their way into bank accounts in Switzerland,
they may well contribute to development (as well
as financial difficulties) there, but most indirectly
to that of the country of origin or, more
accurately. of appropriation.
Some might argue that the most prevalent form
of corruption, that of bribes to minor clerks,
policemen, doorkeepers and the like, has the
effect of redistributing income to an extent which
many governments would like to achieve, but
are took weak to do. So, if one defines develop-
ment as involving a reduction of differences in
wealth, corruption assists the process. It is
obvious, however, that this is a highly dicrimina-
tory redistribution, benefiting only those with the
ability to extort. While it is not altogether
unknown, even in advanced countries, for
extortion to be used as a lever of redistribution,
this method is not generally regarded as desirable.
Even less can it be assumed that income so
redistributed will be channelled into productive
enterprises; it is just as likely that it will be used
to increase consumption.
In brief, then, little conviction is carried by the
arguments that corruption in itself either impedes
or encourages development; these consequences
depend on conditions which should be further
specified. In any case, corruption is a moral, not
an economic, category. To take an analogy, the
corrupt person is similar to the farmer who
diverts to his own fields irrigation water which
is intended for use elsewhere. He is engaged in
theft, pure and simple; whether the water
develops his crops, and whether this is more
'developmental' than the intended use of the
water, is an open question; even if the answer
is positive on both counts, it should not be taken
to legitimise the initial theft.
Funds obtained through corruption are no
different from others dubiously acquired. It is
known, for instance, that Mafia money is
'laundered' by being invested in legitimate enter-
prises. Whether these prosper or not is irrelevant
to the means by which the money was obtained.
nor does it provide an indication whether these
means assist development. In Indonesia recently
an official who had diverted to his own use a
considerable amount of state money was found
to have invested it in several highly 'develop-
mental' enterprises. This did not legitiinise his
corrLiptiOn, nor show that other corrupt officials
similarly helped development.
What, however, of the reverse relationship, that
between development and corruption? To discuss
this aspect, we should bear in mind not the
future goal, but the present reality of develop-
ment; in other words, not the end, but the means.
Throughout most of the Third World, these
comprise the encouragement and control of
economic activities by means of grants, subsidies,
contracts, licences, and permits, authorised by
government and administered by the state
administration. In such countries both govern-
ment and bureaucracy have poor systems of
internal control, as one would perhaps expect.
and in most cases have successfully insulated
themselves from the external control of public
opinion by muzzling the press. Often, even
academic criticism is silenced by ensuring that
all university teachers are civil servants, or are
otherwise dependent on official goodwill. It is
only the students, who are not so placed, who
are free to voice their condemnation of corrup-
tion, and governments are not slow to act against
them when their demands become embarrassing.
The objects, at least in theory, of these develop-
mental activities are a peasantry who live in a
different cultural world from that of their masters,
whose aims they hardly understand. They in
any case have little choice either of development
objectives or of the methods to be used in their
pursuit.
These conditions, one may fairly say, are virtually
guaranteed to generate corruption. The power
to license and permit by itself encourages the
disease. The recent Poulson case in Britain showed
the great temptations which face officials charged
with authorising building projects. lt would be
unwise to assume the case was exceptional. It is
well known that Mr. Poulson was convicted only
because of his passion for hoarding documents;
not everybody has such strongly developed
archival propensities. And this instance of
corruption, it should be noted, occurred in a
bureaucracy which is under constant vigilance by
both press and public.
In the Third World, India has the very great asset
of a well-established bureaucracy and, (apart from
the recent period of so-called 'Emergency') a
vigilant press; corruption is widespread, not only
among politicians, as testified by the recent
revelations of ill-gotten wealth by some of Mrs.
Gandhi's ministers, but also among officials,
especially perhaps the minor.
In most other poor countries, the bureaucracy is
far less developed, so that there are few, if any,
formal constraints to inhibit corruption. In many
poor countries the informal ones are frequently
lacking: for the tradition of government may be
not cf service to the public, but of personal en-
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richment, and no censure attaches to those who
take adv'ntage of their official opportunities. The
same person who is scrupulously honest in his
tribal or caste association may not hesitate to
use government office for his own advantage; it
does not command his moral allegiance in the
same way.
Whether a poor country is governed auto-
cratically, as is usually the case, or democratically,
ordinary people have little opportunity to affect
the framing of legislation that is to be applied
to them. Some at least may well be affected
adversely by the new activities being encouraged.
Not surprisingly, they attempt through bribery
to influence the implementation of legislation;
the officials concerned may often share their
sympathies as they do their money.
As more officials deal with the public, so the
opportunities for corruption multiply. They are
not limited, say, to approval of a licence or per-
mit, but involve all the preceding stages, from the
point where the door-keeper has to be bribed
to allow the applicant to pay 'speed money' to
the clerk who has to pass his application up for
consideration, and so on to the Minister himself.
But the great volume of corrupt money is per-
haps raked in by those state employees in the
intermediate grades, in contact with the public
and able to levy a toll, often in the form of the
ubiquitous 'speed money' or 'dash', on the traffic,
whether of persons, goods, or applications. Some
politicians and senior officials do indeed make
spectacular corrupt gains, but these probably
represent only a small proportion of the vast,
continuous, hidden flow at lower levels.
And as development widens and deepens, so does
corruption. The current policy of concentrating
development effort in the rural areas is a case
in point. The flow of resources will pass through
the bureaucracy to, usually, illiterate and
powerless peasants; the outcome is predictable.
For confirmation one need look no further than
India after the nationalisation of the banks in
the early 1970s. One of the objectives of this
exercise was to make credit facilities more
readily available to rural cultivators. In the
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process, several bank officials enriched them-
selves. Similarly, in Indonesia in the late 1960s a
rural credit scheme was undoubtedly successful
in stimulating increased rice production; however,
it also provided second homes for some of the
officials concerned. In neither case was this
perhaps the redistribution which had been
intended, but any other result would, in Third
World circumstances, have been surprising.
To the temptations generated by state interven-
tion in the economy one must add those offered
by foreign aid and investment, often themselves
closely controlled by the host government. Some
politicians and officials can compel the foreign
investor to pay them a levy on the investments
they publicly solicit, while aid, necessarily passing
through government officials, can be induced
without much difficulty to acquire a certain
adhesiveness. In recent months, some Western
governments have begun applying pressure on
multinational companies not to bribe, willingly
or unwillingly, unscrupulous officials in Third
World countries. It is to be hoped that this will
have salutary effects; though it may be unwise
to be too sanguine.
None of the preceding should be read as
arguments against either interventionism or aid as
methods of development. Rather developers, local
and foreign, should view corruption. as an
unavoidable cost, to be calculated as far as
possible. The irrigation analogy may again be
useful. A newly dug water channel in arid areas
will certainly lose some water through seepage,
but most will reach its destination. The limited
amount lost is not an argument against digging
the channel. When resources permit, it may be
made more impermeable. In similar fashion,
corruption in the Third World is simply a fact
of life of state development, to be accepted for
the time being while taking energetic measures
(such as those in india, Hong Kong and, most
recently, indonesia) to reduce it to a minimum.
1 The cases of Britain and the United States are fairly well
known. For the Soviet Union see Fainsod, M., Smolensk
under Soviet Rule, 1956.
